President Donald Trump’s decision to “substantially reduce” an upcoming U.S.-South Korean military exercise is troubling on its own merits. More troubling is its broader implication: In Trump’s second term, the process for making America’s national security policy is fundamentally broken.
Only hours before the joint exercise was scheduled to begin, Trump wrote a Truth Social post calling the exercises costly and “hostile,” describing North Korea as “unthreatening and respectful” and citing his “very good relationship” with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un.
The president’s apparent faith in his rapport with a dictator repeats a central error of his first-term policy toward Korea, when Trump said that he and Kim “fell in love” after exchanging letters.
The timing of Trump’s post alone should raise concerns. Just a day earlier, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung had called for negotiations between the two countries, aimed at peaceful coexistence and eventually replacing the Korean War armistice with a peace treaty.
Lee’s proposal sought to assess Pyongyang’s willingness to reduce tensions through diplomacy while the alliance preserved its deterrent strength. Trump instead made a unilateral concession before negotiations began, and it is unclear if our South Korean allies were briefed on his decision in advance.
Nor is Trump’s description of North Korea as “unthreatening” and “respectful” consistent with the country’s actions. Just this month, the nation tested ballistic missiles twice and deployed a missile unit as well as additional troops to support Russian attacks on Ukraine.
Trump appears to be confusing Kim’s treatment of him personally with North Korea’s conduct toward the United States, its allies and the international order. The president’s apparent faith in his rapport with a dictator repeats a central error of his first-term policy toward Korea, when Trump said that he and Kim “fell in love” after exchanging letters. Their summits generated dramatic images but failed to produce any progress toward denuclearization, meaningful limits on North Korea’s arsenal or a durable system focused on reducing military risk.
Personal diplomacy can support a coherent strategy. It cannot substitute for one. Kim has every incentive to flatter Trump if doing so strains relations between Washington and Seoul, weakens joint military exercises or legitimizes North Korea as a nuclear power.
In the same post, Trump complained that Lee declined to join the U.S. war against Iran. Weakening an exercise in Korea because of anger over a conflict half a world away turns deterrence into an instrument of political revenge rather than as a shared security commitment.
The president whipsaws from claiming negotiations are progressing to declaring the Strait of Hormuz open to threatening new bombing campaigns. This often arbitrary and impulsive decision-making occurs apparently with no vetting process or policy process.
This apparent pettiness is all the starker given its potentially serious operational consequences. Approximately 28,500 American troops are stationed in South Korea, and their readiness posture reflects the fact that a conflict could begin with little warning and require immediate coordination between American and South Korean forces. Joint exercises rehearse the necessary command relationships, communications, logistics, air and missile defense, reinforcement, medical evacuation and responses to rapidly changing battlefield conditions.
Training can sometimes be modified to advance diplomacy. But doing so effectively requires careful planning, consultation with allies and anticipation of a potential adversary’s responses — in this case, reciprocal North Korean actions. An abrupt reduction, announced shortly before a military exercise starts, risks degrading readiness without securing additional restraint by North Korea.
This decision could also increase the possibility of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. The U.S. has long pledged to defend South Korea, including with nuclear weapons if needed. But Trump’s statement likely will reinforce the fears of many South Koreans that the Republic of Korea can no longer rely on Washington’s security guarantee, and only by developing its own nuclear arsenal can Seoul ensure its future security. Japanese officials and voters will also draw their own conclusions. Consequently, a decision presented as an attempt to reduce tension could make Northeast Asia less stable.
But ultimately the deepest concern is institutional. Were any top diplomatic or military officials in the U.S. or South Korea consulted? Did policymakers assess readiness, alliance management, proliferation and allies’ interests before Trump posted his announcement? Or did they learn of the president’s decision when the rest of us did?
It is possible that consultations occurred. Absent the administration providing an explanation of the process, however, the timing of Trump’s decision and its delivery via social media give every appearance of policy made solely by presidential impulse, if not irrationality.
This conclusion is reinforced by Trump’s recent threats surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and Oman. At a recent rally, the president announced that he was going to make the Strait of Hormuz American territory. He subsequently threatened to bomb Oman if Muscat concluded an agreement with Iran for control of the waterway.
Under this president, such rhetoric is not unusual. But it suggests that policy increasingly is the result of whatever the president decides at a particular moment. Indeed, the Iran conflict, from its very beginning, has demonstrated the broken state of this White House’s decision-making. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, among others, encouraged Trump’s view that hostilities would be over quickly. “Even the more skeptical members of Mr. Trump’s war cabinet,” reported the New York Times, “deferred to the president’s instincts, including his abundant confidence that the war would be quick and decisive.”
Almost six months later, there is no end in sight for the conflict, even as the U.S. burns through munitions stocks. The president whipsaws from claiming negotiations are progressing to declaring the Strait of Hormuz open to threatening new bombing campaigns. This often arbitrary and impulsive decision-making occurs apparently with no vetting process or policy process.
Americans can debate whether a particular military exercise should be revised to facilitate diplomacy. What they cannot accept is alliance policy made through flattery, grievance and improvisation. The immediate mistake is reducing readiness without obtaining any reciprocal concessions from Pyongyang. The greater danger is that America’s national security process may no longer be functioning.
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