Mamdani shutting down a rogue NYPD unit doesn’t warrant the right’s panicky response

On Monday, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani announced that he was abolishing the New York Police Department’s controversial Strategic Response Group, a tactical unit established for counterterrorism duty. But it was also often deployed at protests, where its aggressive responses led to litigation and ultimately a settlement that forced the NYPD to change how it polices demonstrations.

Unsurprisingly, several conservative defenders of conventional policing practices were quick to condemn Mamdani’s action, although they couldn’t reach a consensus on whether his decision is a radical shift that will usher in rampant lawlessness or simply him taking credit for changing nothing.

The details are, sadly, still pretty thin, and here they will be everything. So it’s worth looking at what the SRG is — or soon was — and what exactly Mamdani is changing, which isn’t nothing but may be much less than it appears.

An ugly truth about policing is that who the officers are typically matters far more than any set of formal rules to regulate them.

Then-Mayor Bill de Blasio established the SRG back in 2015 to address fears over terrorism and large-scale disruptions; and while the NYPD initially said it would not be used to police protests, that promise was quickly broken. Participation in the SRG was entirely voluntary, which raises concerns that it would draw in officers who were looking for “more action” — in other words, those looking to use force.

And the data backs up those fears. A 2020 article in The Appeal documented extensive misconduct histories among SRG officers and commanders, often well above NYPD-wide averages. Legal groups like the New York Civil Liberties Union have likewise documented the unit’s history of violence toward peaceful protest. (It’s telling that the opponents of Mamdani’s reform are quick to point out the one time the NYPD stopped a potentially violent protester, but somehow fail to mention all the times the police themselves sent people to the hospital.)

In fact, the NYCLU, along with the Legal Aid Society and the New York Attorney General’s Office, eventually sued the NYPD over the SRG’s tactics in federal court, resulting in the so-called Payne settlement in February 2024. The settlement did not ban the SRG but it did limit the NYPD’s ability to deploy it at protests, and it also imposed an array of other limitations on the force NYPD officers could use on protesters.

Several of the issues raised in Mamdani’s announcement this week, particularly limits on tactics such as “kettling” protesters or using pepper spray aggressively, are already contained in the Payne settlement. Other limits, such as those on using long guns or tear gas, are not in the Payne settlement but also have not been used by the NYPD in recent times anyway. Along these lines, Mamdani’s executive action does not change the rules in place since 2024 — a period that has seen New York City’s murder and shooting counts hit historic lows, making the sky-is-falling claims ring particularly hollow.

But the announcement does include some actual changes, and they are ones with the potential to make the city even safer. The devil, though, is in the details, which remain unclear and unresolved.

The first (possible) big change is abolishing the SRG entirely and reassigning most of its current officers to the Counterterrorism Bureau. The plan would then create a new “Patrol Support Division,” whose officers would be trained to handle protests and provide support services around the city in difficult cases at other times. This, in many ways, sounds just like the SRG.

In announcing the creation of the PSD, though, Mamdani said there will be “strict eligibility requirements” to join the division. He gave no details about what those would be or who would evaluate candidates. If the standards are weak, the PSD could just be the rebranding of the SRG. But if the standards are, in fact, strict and carefully administered, this sort of vetting could make a real difference.

An ugly truth about policing is that who the officers are typically matters far more than any set of formal rules to regulate them. If the vetting — or even just the shift in crimes covered — is designed to screen out the sort of aggression-seeking cops who opted into the SRG, then the PSD will likely act very differently than the SRG. But if the new group is vetting like the SRG and assigned to similar tasks, then this seems more like a renaming of the SRG than anything else. It’s impossible to say for now which it is.

The second (possible) big change is creating a new civilian Community Dialogue and De-escalation Division, housed inside the mayor’s new Office of Community Safety, to work alongside a new (again, vetted-in-ways-not-yet-made-clear) unit within the NYPD’s Community Affairs Bureau to monitor protests. This, too, could just be redrawing lines on an org chart, but it could be much more.

While the CAB is framed as a neutral liaison between the community and the NYPD, it’s clear that it uses its resources to empower voices that support the NYPD and marginalize those that do not. Given that many protests in NYC are directed against the NYPD, forcing CAB officers to work with nonpolice civilians could make it harder for the NYPD to impede protesters’ First Amendment rights.

In short, much of what Mamdani is doing is forcing the NYPD to write down what the department already agreed to in court in 2024. NYC’s counterterrorism staffing isn’t changing, and the changes he is adopting will at worst change almost nothing, but have the potential to reduce police violence during peaceful protests — which often seems to escalate because aggressive officers like those in the SRG have arrived.

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