A woman’s death last week near a Russian facility studying the plague immediately put the world on alert. This is the plague, after all, responsible for the deaths of some half of the humans in Europe during the worst outbreak in the 1300s. And it happened in Russia, a country with a long history of bioweapon experimentation.

After the Covid-19 pandemic — which many people, including many scientists, genuinely believe started with the virus escaping from a Chinese laboratory — the worst-case scenario was obvious: What if this is another lab leak that seeds a global outbreak?

That’s not likely, for a number of reasons (the facility is very isolated, plague is not nearly as infectious as Covid, it’s easily treated if caught early). But that doesn’t mean our work with such dangerous pathogens has gotten any safer; in fact, it may be getting less so. The anxiety about the Russian outbreak is a window into two trend lines that do worry global health experts: In the six years since the Covid-19 outbreak, the world has been building even more bioresearch facilities, some in places where that kind of work has never been done before; meanwhile oversight of the science and the security measures at those facilities is struggling to keep up.

Every day, humanity is playing with fire, studying and tinkering with deadly viruses, bacteria, and parasites in laboratories all over the world. And despite the recent debates over rogue AIs or AI-assisted humans intentionally developing bioweapons to wipe out humanity, the Russian incident is a reminder that a simple accident — human error — could pose as much of a threat as malice. While it is hard to confirm the details, local reporting suggests the worker may have been infected after breaking a test tube. And if that’s true, this would, of course, not be the first time that a mistake at a highly secure lab has put people’s lives at risk.

“We are rolling back any progress we made post-Covid, in ways that are going to have long-term effects on our ability to respond to any kind of outbreak.”

Gregory Koblentz, co-founded the Global BioLabs project

Since the pandemic, there has been a dramatic uptick in facilities being built to handle some of the most dangerous pathogens in existence. At the same time, there is still no global authority in charge of oversight for these sites. The US, once the world’s public health leader, has pulled out of the World Health Organization, which issues security guidance for labs around the world and helps coordinate a response when there is a possible emergency, and cut funding for the federal agencies responsible for overseeing US biosecurity facilities. And even after something as global as Covid, the world is still struggling to cooperate and rapidly share information during a health crisis; even now, it can be hard to be sure what is happening in Siberia. Our only sources of information are a Russian government prone to withholding and distorting information, and local news reports that are difficult to verify.

Even if this Russian plague threat fizzles out as expected, one day, we may not be so lucky. 

“We are rolling back any progress we made post-Covid, in ways that are going to have long-term effects on our ability to respond to any kind of outbreak, whether it’s natural or deliberate or an accident,” Gregory Koblentz, who studies global biosecurity at George Mason University and co-founded the Global BioLabs project, told me. 

But there are clear things that can be done, before our luck runs out. 

Countries are building more high-level biolabs, but oversight is falling behind

One of the side effects of the pandemic was a biological laboratory building boom that followed in its wake. Global BioLabs, the research initiative Koblentz helps run, has sought to create a comprehensive survey of high-level labs around the world. Take Biosafety Lab, Level 4 facilities, for example; these are built to handle the most dangerous pathogens in existence, like ebola and smallpox. Global BioLabs noted in its 2023 report that “the number of BSL4 labs is rapidly increasing.” 

This is not the first time that a public health emergency has led to a biolab buildout: The post-9/11 anthrax scares and the first SARS outbreak in the early 2000s both led to countries constructing new facilities. In the late 1990s, there were fewer than 10 BSL4 labs in the world; by the late 2010s, there were almost 40. 

But the pandemic accelerated construction once again. In 2021, there were 59 BSL4 labs either in operation, under construction or actively being planned worldwide; by 2023, 10 more facilities had been completed or were in the works, according to Global BioLabs.

Part of the reason for the buildout is a harsh lesson of the pandemic: Developing countries realized they could not depend on wealthier countries to also prioritize their needs during a serious crisis. So they wanted the capacity to handle deadly biological material themselves in case, for instance, they have a local outbreak and want to be able to safely identify the cause. India alone is planning four new BSL4 facilities; at least five countries — including Brazil, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Spain— have started building or recently opened their first BSL4 lab. As a result, this construction is happening in places with less institutional experience doing this kind of work, where government oversight and stability have been weaker. 

“The more facilities that are working on this raises concerns about whether all this work is necessary,” Koblentz said. “And do they have the appropriate biosafety and biosecurity management systems in place?” 

That could raise the risks of unsound safety protocols — and ultimately of more high-stakes accidents. On top of that, according to the 2023 Global BioLabs report, about 75 percent of the existing operational BSL4 labs in the world are located in city centers, having at least 50,000 people living within 2.5 miles of the lab, “where dense populations could exacerbate the impact of an accidental release.”

And yet, even as lab construction takes off, national and international standards for governing these facilities and the research conducted there remain lax. There is no global organization that inspects or regulates these sites. One key voluntary group — the International Experts Group of Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulators — has actually gone defunct in recent years, Koblentz said. And national laws are patchy: Only one of the 27 countries with a BSL4 lab has comprehensive national legislation regulating “dual-use” gain-of-function research, in which scientists can tinker with pathogens to make them more transmissible or more virulent — and better understand how they work.

The WHO’s pandemic treaty initially included stronger biosecurity protections, but those were watered down during the debate over the document  — and either way, the treaty has still not been finalized. The US has of course also withdrawn from that and other international efforts to improve pandemic preparedness, further examples of the failure to forge more global cooperation in the wake of Covid. 

We need a more transparent approach to dangerous — but potentially life-saving — science

It could be easy to say we should simply stop studying dangerous viruses or enhancing them, even in highly controlled laboratory settings — but the situation is not that simple. Scientists do this kind of work to prepare for the next pandemic, to better understand how the viruses and bacteria that pose the biggest threat to humanity actually function, so that we can beat them back as quickly as possible. 

If you told somebody on the street that scientists are tinkering with a virus to see how it could become more dangerous, they would probably want the scientists to stop. But if you told them those scientists are doing work that could lead to faster therapeutics or vaccines during the next pandemic and avoid the need for lockdown and save millions of lives, they might be more open to this kind of research.

“The real question is: ‘What are the risks and what are the benefits?’” Beth Cameron, senior adviser to the Brown Pandemic Center at Brown University, told me. “We need to have a more rational conversation about what we’re actually talking about,” she said about these sorts of threats that are poised to have, as she puts it, “large-scale societal consequences.” 

And some of those are still circulating today. The reason Russia has this Siberian lab dedicated to plague research is because plague is still endemic in Russia.

“The dangerous pathogens are there already,” Koblentz said. The question is, he said: “How do you do it safely and securely?”

A starting point would be individual labs adopting new safety protocols, such as those from the International Organization for Standardization that were introduced shortly before the pandemic, Koblentz said. Additionally, as countries are building out their lab facilities, they need to develop strong oversight standards at the same time; the buildings may be flashy and have state-of-the-art equipment, but governments also need to address the mundane work of how to inspect and maintain safety once work begins as an equally important part of the process.

“If this is their first lab, in some cases, they don’t have very strong national legal and regulatory mechanisms for biosafety and biosecurity. They might not have the human capital,” Koblentz said. The regulatory side of the project unfortunately gets “short shrift,” he said.

Ideally, the world would have an international mechanism for auditing these sites, Koblentz said, something like an International Atomic Energy Agency but for biosecurity. There would be more transparent debates about what kind of research is done at high-security labs and whether it is truly important.

Better worldwide biosecurity will also likely require the US once again becoming a global health leader. The withdrawal from multinational groups like the WHO and cuts to government science funding have left everyone more vulnerable. Politics has consequences — including for our risks of a biosecurity catastrophe.

“Our level of preparedness for an outbreak, whether it is a lab accident or a natural outbreak of plague or anything else has been dramatically reduced in the last two years,” Koblentz said. “We’ve got a whole lot of problems that are self-inflicted at this point because of what the Trump administration is doing.”

The pandemic should have been a lesson in how important biosecurity really is. Instead, we’re unlearning its lessons in less than a decade. The Russian plague incident could be an essential wake-up call.

Source: Vox.